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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB B. LOVELESS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20070419-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from, the trial court's interlocutory order permitting 
defendant to enter a guilty plea to the alternative lesser offense of reckless 
endangerment. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(c) 
(West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
May a trial court accept a defendant's guilty plea to an alternative lesser 
charge over the prosecutor's objection and in the face of the prosecutor's alternative 
motion to dismiss the lesser charge? 
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] a trial court's acceptance or rejection 
of a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 
1188,1189-90 (Utah App. 1998). 
Preservation. The issue was preserved at the April 9, 2007 hearing, which 
considered defendant's notice of intent to enter a guilty plea to the alternative lesser 
charge of reckless endangerment. See R. 476. The issue was also preserved in the 
State's memorandum in support of its motion to reconsider and at the hearing on 
the motion to reconsider held on April 10, 2007. R. 462-38; R. 477. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
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(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1, 
1995. 
§ 76-5-112, Reckless endangerment—Penalty 
(1) A person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that 
creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. 
(2) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor. 
Laws 1999, c. 66, § 1, eff. May 3,1999. 
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 An assault includes "an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(l)(c) (West 2004). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While at a late night party at a campsite, defendant fired his .45 caliber 
handgun into a sleeping bag occupied by the victim, causing him serious bodily 
injury. See R. 62-60, 67-66. The State charged defendant with reckless 
endangerment, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 
(West 2004). R. 1. The State later filed an amended information, charging defendant 
with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103 (West 2004), or alternatively, reckless endangerment. R. 25-24. After 
defendant was bound over on the alternative charges, he unsuccessfully moved to 
quash the bindover. R. 45-44,77-72.2 After more than a year of litigation on various 
defense motions, the case was ready to proceed to trial. See R. 87-84,299-56 (motion 
to quash jury list); R. 423-27,07 (motion to exclude evidence of alcohol or drug use). 
Four days before trial was to begin, defendant filed a notice of intent to enter 
a guilty plea to the alternative lesser charge of reckless endangerment and requested 
that the matter be set for a plea hearing. R. 431-30. At a pretrial conference three 
days later, the State objected to the plea attempt, arguing that defendant could not 
unilaterally decide to enter a plea to an alternative charge. R. 476: 4-5. 
2
 The informations also charged defendant with possession of a dangerous 
weapon while under the influence, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1,25-24. That charge 
was bound over for trial, but later dismissed on defendant's motion to quash the 
bindover. R. 74-73. The dismissal of that charge is not at issue on appeal. 
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Alternatively, the State moved to dismiss the alternative charge of reckless 
endangerment R. 476:6-7. The trial court rejected both arguments. The court ruled 
that by charging alternative offenses, the State gave defendant the option of 
pleading guilty to one or the other, and having done so, could not object to a plea to 
the alternative charge or otherwise dismiss the alternative charge after defendant 
stated an intention to so plead. R. 476: 19-21; R. 434-33. At the scheduled plea 
hearing the following day, the State filed a motion to reconsider. R. 462-38. The 
court denied the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on both 
motions. R. 437-36,472-67 (Addendum). That same day, the court entered an order 
to stay a plea hearing pending resolution of the State's petition for interlocutory 
appeal. R. 474-73. This Court granted the State's petition for interlocutory appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor not only has broad discretion in determining whether to file 
charges and what charges to file, but also to determine in what manner to prosecute 
a case. The prosecutor's discretion in prosecuting a case does not, therefore, end 
with the filing of the information, but includes such decisions as whether to dismiss 
a charge and whether to agree to a plea to a lesser offense. The prosecutor's 
decision to file alternative charges does not remove that discretion. The trial court 
thus abused its discretion in permitting defendant to plead to the alternative lesser 
offense over the prosecutor's objection. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING 
DEFENDANT TO PLEAD TO AN ALTERNATIVE LESSER OFFENSE 
OVER THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTION 
The trial court ruled that "defendant has the right to enter a plea to the 
alternative offense" of reckless endangerment R. 468. The court explained that "the 
State takes that chance when [it] files in the alternative, especially ... where the 
alternative was a lesser valued or a lesser charged Class A misdemeanor, with lesser 
punishments/7 R. 476:19. The court further ruled that once a defendant has stated 
his intention to plead to the lesser offense, the State cannot frustrate that intent by 
dismissing the alternative charge. See R. 476: 21. The State filed a motion to 
reconsider, which the trial court denied. R. 472-67; R. 477: 26-38. The trial court's 
ruling permitting defendant to plead guilty to the alternative lesser charge over the 
prosecutor's objection was an abuse of its discretion. 
This Court's decision in State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1998) 
controls. In Turner, a motorcyclist was killed after colliding with Turner's truck, 
which had swerved over the center line. Id. at 1189. Turner was charged with 
driving left of center and negligent homicide. Id. Over the State's objection, Turner 
pled guilty to driving left of center and was sentenced on that charge. Id. Turner 
thereafter argued that because he pled guilty and had been sentenced to a lesser 
included crime, the State was precluded from pursuing the negligent homicide 
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charge. Id. The trial court agreed, ruling that '"[w]hen the activity of a defendant 
involved in such an episode establishes offenses which may be punishable in 
different ways, the conduct shall be punished under only one such provision and a 
conviction or entry of guilty plea and sentence on one bars a prosecution on the 
other/" Id. (quoting trial court). 
In reversing the ruling of the trial court, Turner held that a defendant "ha[s] 
no absolute right to have his plea of guilt accepted/7 Id. at 1190. This Court held 
that although a trial court has discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea, that 
"[discretion is abused if the actions of the judge are inherently unfair/' or if the 
judge's decision is otherwise '"beyond the limits of reasonableness/" Id. (quoting 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332,334 (Utah 1993)). The Court also held that "'[a]n abuse 
of discretion results when the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors/" Id. 
(quoting State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356,358 (Utah 1996)). 
Turner observed that "'[s]ociety has [an] interest in the vindication of criminal 
justice and . . . the state . . . ha[s] an interest in an error free determination of the 
case/" Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that "acceptance of 
the plea over the timely and specific objections of the State was unfair and 
unreasonable" because it "effectively nullified the State's right to prosecute 
defendant on the charge of negligent homicide." Id. 
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In this case, the Fourth District Court's decision to accept defendant's plealto 
reckless endangerment, over the timely and specific objections of the State, was, las 
in Turner, "unfair and unreasonable." Id. As in Turner, the district court's acticfn 
will "effectively nulliffy] the State's right to prosecute defendant" on a particular 
charge in its pursuit of society's interest "'in the vindication of criminal justice/" i.4., 
aggravated assault. Id.; cf. State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1992) (holding 
that defendant does not have the right to waive a jury trial). For this reason, this 
Court should reverse the ruling of the trial court. 
The trial court concluded, however, that Turner does not apply here becausb 
this case involves an alternative offense, rather than a "lesser offense," as in Turnet. 
R. 468. Whether or not reckless endangerment is a lesser offense to aggravated 
assault, the distinction is irrelevant. The effect in either case is to preclude the Statf 
from exercising its right to prosecute the case in the manner it deems appropriate* 
As observed by the Utah Supreme Court three decades ago, when the State charged 
in the alternative, it "need not make an election upon which theory it will proceed if 
the theories specified in the information are not repugnant to each other." State Vi 
Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,1138 (Utah 1977). It follows that defendant cannot force thai 
election, or take away the State's right to try a defendant in the alternative, by 
simply pleading to the alternative charge. 
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Prosecutors enjoy "the traditional discretion ... to determine what crime to 
charge/7 State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995). That charging discretion 
includes the right to "charge offenses in the alternative." State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 
441,443 (Utah 1996) (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 4(i)). But a prosecutor's discretion in 
pursuing a prosecution does not end with the filing of an information. Prosecutors 
are not only given the discretion to determine whether to prosecute a case and what 
charges to file, but also the discretion to determine "in what manner to prosecute [a] 
case." State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 402 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis 
added); accord State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1,3 (Utah App. 1988).3 The discretion vested in 
the prosecutor includes the authority "'to determine whether or not to prosecute, 
what charge should be made, and whether or not to dismiss, apply for immunity, or 
accept a plea to a lesser offense/" Bell, 785 P.2d at 404 (quoting State v. Grayer, 215 
N.W.2d 859, 861 (Neb. 1974)). In other words, as a general rule, the prosecutor 
directs the entire prosecution, from the filing of the charges to the presentation of 
the evidence to the jury. A defendant cannot sabotage that discretion by pleading to 
an alternative lesser charge. 
3
 An abuse of the prosecutor's discretion will be found if based on arbitrary 
classifications in violation of a defendant's right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment or right to the uniform operation of laws under article I, 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution. See Bell, 785 P.2d at 403; Mohi, 901 P.2d at 995-
1004. Such equal protection issues are not implicated here. 
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The trial court reasoned that by filing an alternative lesser offense, the 
prosecutor took the "chance" that defendant would plead guilty to the lesser offense 
and was therefore "getting what [he] deservefd]."' R. 476: 19, 24. The court thiis 
ruled, in effect, that a prosecutor cedes to defendant his or her control over t ie 
prosecution once the charges have been filed. But, as reiterated by the Utdh 
Supreme Court in Montoya, "'a criminal trial is much more than just a content 
between the State and an individual which is determined by strategies appropriate 
to determining the outcome of a game/" Montoya, 910 P.2d at 446 (quoting State | . 
Howellf 649 P.2d 91,94 (Utah 1982)). Rather, it "'is the vindication of the laws of n 
civilized society against those who are guilty of transgressing those laws/" Id. 
(quoting Howell, 649 P.2d at 94). For this reason, a trial court may instruct a jury om 
a necessarily included offense that was not specifically charged in the informatioit 
Howell, 649 P.2d at 94-95. As explained in Howell, "it would be a mockery of out 
criminal laws for a court to ignore a proved crime and acquit on the charged crime! 
when the defendant is not prejudiced in presenting a full and complete defense tcf 
the proved crime." Id. at 95. 
It would likewise be a mockery of our criminal laws to permit a defendant tq 
plead to an alternative lesser offense over the prosecutor's objection where thei 
evidence is also sufficient to present the greater offense to a jury, as here. See R. 36. 
"[A]s long as the prosecution has probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
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committed, the decision regarding ... in what manner to prosecute 'generally rests 
entirely in [the prosecutor's] discretion/ " Bell, 785 P.2d at 402 (quoting Geer, 765 
P.2d at 3) (other quotations and citations omitted). 
Often times, little doubt may exist that a crime was committed, but some 
ambiguity may exist, given the nature of the evidence, as to what particular crime 
was committed. This is such a case. Defendant fired his handgun several times into 
an area where partygoers were likely to be, and while doing so, shot the victim, who 
was lying in a sleeping bag a short distance away. Although defendant claimed a 
belief that he was firing into a log, there is little doubt that he committed a crime. 
Just what that crime was depended on the facts. 
Defendant may be guilty of third degree felony aggravated assault or of 
reckless endangerment. He is guilty of a third degree aggravated assault if he 
committed an assault (an act committed with unlawful force or violence that caused 
bodily injury to another) using a dangerous weapon and did so under circumstances 
not amounting to the intentional infliction of serious bodily injury to another. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(c) & § 76-5-103(l)(b), (3) (West 2004). Under this 
variation of the statute, the "aggravated assault can be committed by reckless 
conduct/' State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988). On the other hand, 
defendant is guilty of reckless endangerment "if, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, [he] recklessly engaged in conduct that create[d] a 
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substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person/7 Utah Cotie 
Ann. § 76-5-112(1) (West 2004). The prosecutor had the discretion to charge and flry 
the two offenses in the alternative. The trial court abused its discretion wheniit 
precluded the prosecutor from exercising his prosecutorial discretion by insistiiig 
that defendant be tried for the greater crime. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
the trial court's order and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted October 30,2007. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
R^EY S. GRAY 
^Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : RE: DEFENDANT'S NOTICE 
OF INTENT TO ENTER PLEA 
TO ALTERNATIVE 
: OFFENSE AND STATE'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
vs. : Case No. 041403254 
JACOB B. LOVELESS, : 
Division No. 3 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on before the for hearing Court on April 9, 2007, on 
Defendant's Notice of Intent to Enter Plea to one of the alternative offenses 
charged in Count 1 of the Information and on April 10, 2007, on the State's 
Motion to Reconsider Ruling. Having fully considered the pleadings, 
MAY 0 i 20 
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memorandum submitted, the statement of the alleged victim, and oral 
argument of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 18, 2004, the state filed an Information charging the 
defendant in Count 1 with Reckless Endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, 
and Count 2, Carrying a Dangerous While Under the Influence of Alcohol or 
a Controlled Substance, a Class B. misdemeanor. 
2. On October 25, 2004, defendant appeared with counsel and entered 
pleas of not guilty to both counts of the Information. The matter was set for 
a pretrial conference to be held on December 9, 2004. 
3. The parties appeared at the pretrial conference and the Court set 
the matter for a jury trial to held on March 22 & 23, 2005. 
4. On January 12, 2005, the state filed an Amended Information 
alleging, Count 1: Aggravated Assault, in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-103, a 
third degree felony, or, in the alternative, Reckless Endangerment, in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-112, a class A misdemeanor. 
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5. The jury trial was stricken and the matter was set for a preliminary 
hearing. 
6. On March 2, 2005, the preliminary hearing was held before the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
7. Following submission of a Motion to Quash Bindover, memoranda 
in support and in opposition, and oral argument, on June 16, 2005, the Court 
issued its ruling binding the defendant over on Count 1, containing the two 
alternative charges, but dismissed Count 2. 
8. Following other pretrial motions and hearing, this matter was set to 
be tried on April 10 & 11, 2007. 
9. On April 6, 2007, defendant filed a Notice of Intent to Enter Plea 
of Guilty to Count 1, Reckless Endangerment. 
10. The Court did not become aware of the notice until after 5:00 
p.m., but was able to contact defense counsel by telephone and determine 
that the plea was not a result of a plea bargain and that the state was opposed 
to the entry of plea to the alternative offense. The Court instructed 
defendant's counsel to contact Mr. Kennard, the attorney for the state in 
3 413 
order that the issue could be resolved at a hearing on Monday, April 9, 2007, 
prior to the date of the jury trial. 
11. The parties appeared on April 9, 2007, presented oral arguments to 
the Court on the issue of whether the defendant should be allowed to enter 
his plea to one of the alternative offenses in the Amended Information. 
12. During the April 9, 2007 hearing, the state moved to amend the 
Information by dismissing the alternative offense of Reckless 
Endangerment. 
13. Following the arguments of the parties, the Court denied the 
motion of the state to amend as being untimely and as a response to 
defendant's notice to enter plea. The Court also ruled that the defendant 
should be allowed to enter his plea of guilty to the alternative offenses of 
Reckless Endangerment. 
14. The plea of the defendant was set to be entered on April 10, 2007. 
15. The state filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling on the afternoon of 
April 9, 2007. 
4 
16. On April 10, 2007, the court heard argument of the parties and 
received a statement of the victim opposing the entry of plea. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant has a right to enter a plea to the alternative offense 
charged in Count 1. State v. Turner, is not applicable to the facts of this case 
since Turner dealt with whether or not a defendant could enter a plea to a 
count charging a lesser offenseniot the present case where the state has given 
the defendant two options by charging in the alternative. 
2. There is nothing in the rules that prevents the defendant from 
pleading as charged without the approval of the state. Rule 17 (c) does not 
require the state's approval if a defendant desires to plead as charged. There 
is no case law that would allow the state to force a defendant who wants to 
plead guilty to go to trial. The rule and State v. Studham, cited by the state, 
stands for the proposition that the state has to agree to a bench trial rather 
than a jury trial, not that the state can force a defendant to go to trial. 
3. Rule 7(i)(2) states that the defendant shall be required to answer to 
the charges*not that he must go to trial. 
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4. Rule 9.5(b) does not apply as it deals with severance, nor does the 
case submitted by the state apply to the issues before this Court. 
5. Rule 11(d) does not prevent a defendant from entering a plea and is 
not applicable to the issues before the Court. 
RULING/ORDER 
1. The motion to reconsider is denied. The defendant should be 
allowed to enter his plea to the alternative charge of Reckless 
Endangerment. 
Dated this f ^ d a y of 1 ^ 2 0 0 7 . 
Approved: 
BY THE COURT:» 
CLAUDIA^£AYd<2gM i % 
District Judge^ 
''-^•-rpMi^W' 
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